Human Rights and Zimbabwe's Presidential Election: March 2002
A Special Report by the Research Unit
May, 2002

Chapter 9:  Political Violations of Civil, Social and Economic Rights

Freedom of movement   

Economic and social rights

Religion and politics 

This report has so far documented violations of political rights. At the root of the socio-political problems was, arguably, the escalating economic decline which caused unbelievably high unemployment and ever-widening impoverishment. Long given to political circumspection, even the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries finally issued a strong press statement regretting its past unsuccessful attempts to convince government to follow sound economic policies.

But the political violence, in particular, as well as the police enforcement of the Public Order and Security Act, also violated many other rights adumbrated in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Table 9.1 gives a preliminary count of these violations between 1 January and 31 March 2002. The figures come from press and other published reports, and from the reports of victims themselves to human rights organisations. (Where there are overlaps, we have not double-counted published and unpublished information.) The reporting of (especially) rural cases is often considerably delayed, sometimes by months, so we expect these ‘minimalist’ figures to grow in the months ahead. The total is also separated into its pre-election, polling, and post-election components, where precise dates are known.

Excluded from table 9.1 are some 1 400 MDC polling agents, who were variously kidnapped, assaulted, detained (whether by ZANU-PF or by the State) and/or tortured – because reasonably precise figures for those victimised in these different ways are, as yet, unknown. Five of the six polling agents who were killed after the poll have been included (the sixth was killed in early April, thus missing the cut-off date).

Excluded also are army and police assaults on many urban queues during or at the end of the first voting day; thousands in polling queues dispersed by the riot police and/or army at the end of the second or third days who ultimately were prevented from exercising their right to vote; and unknown tens of thousands of villagers supporting the MDC in Mberengwa, Shamva and Madziwa districts, who have been subjected to massive post-election discriminatory violence and driven out of, or fled, their homes.

Of particular note in these figures are the large numbers of cases of death threats and other forms of political intimidation and discrimination, as well as the impairment of the right to vote. It is quite clear from these figures that massive intimidation and discrimination have continued unabated after polling, as, indeed, have the killings. There are also unacceptably high levels of kidnapping and torture, with less serious assaults running at four times the rate of torture.

Not shown in table 9.1, but of interest, are the party-differentiated rates of victimisation and violation. Taking merely the cases known (not the total victims from these cases), the victims were MDC in 306 cases, compared to ZANU-PF in 47, including three cases in which both parties provided victims as well as violators. MDC supporters were 6,5 times more likely to be the victims than their ZANU-PF counterparts. Conversely, MDC violators in 67 cases contrasted with 469 ZANU-PF violators, showing that members of ZANU-PF were seven times more likely than MDC supporters to perpetrate political violations.

This difference between the parties in respect of victimhood and perpetration is especially significant in respect of the political violations which cost 54 people their lives from the start of 2002 (40 before polling, 11 after the election and three on unknown dates in March 2002). Those killed were not necessarily members of either major party, but the MDC lost 33 members while allegedly killing seven people, whereas ZANU-PF lost six members, while allegedly killing 32, sometimes acting in concert with ‘war veterans’.

Table 9.1. Human rights violations resulting from political violence in Zimbabwe,

before, during and after the 2002 Presidential Election.

> means more than

Freedom of Movement

In addition to violating civil rights including those to life and liberty, party violence also affected basic rights to mobility and assembly. At least two rural bus companies reported ZANU-PF had molested their buses and crews. One pulled out of routes in Masvingo and Mashonaland West. Another had its buses hijacked over 100 kms to ZANU-PF rallies.[1] State-owned District Development Fund vehicles were also reported to have been used to bus ZANU-PF supporters to rallies.[2] All rural buses were required to carry ZANU-PF advertising, free of charge, in order to pass through illegal roadblocks.

Other travellers, not hijacked to ZANU-PF rallies, had their freedom of movement impaired by these illegal roadblocks and demands for ZANU-PF memberships cards as laissez passer.

The police prevented many MDC supporters from holding, or attending, political rallies.

Those assembling to discuss, and marching in favour of, a new constitution were harassed by the police, both before and after the elections. Innocent shoppers in central Harare had their movements disturbed by ZANU-PF’s ‘peaceful’ demonstration – which showed the international observers first-hand what that party regards as ‘peaceful’ behaviour. Immediately after the election result was announced, both army and riot police enforced an undeclared night-time curfew in high-density suburbs.

The obverse of impaired urban and urban-rural movement was, of course, enforced movement in the countryside, as farmowners and farmworkers were evicted at short notice by ‘war veterans’ and those who had occupied their farms. MDC supporters, especially civil servants and teachers, were also chased around and out of their homes, and often their jobs, in ZANU-PF’s post-election retaliation.

Economic and social rights

Many, varied civic organisations concerned with human rights weighed into the political campaign. Their media advertisements condemned political violence and, particularly, hate speech, racial incitement and all forms of intimidation.

The Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET) had been involved in reconciling those involved in past political violence for some six months before the election. In the last week before polling, ZIMCET worried that the perpetrators of daily violence seemed to be ‘protected’ in their assaults on most freedoms previously enjoyed by Zimbabweans, including rights to work, property, health and education.

Apart from the numerous schools closed by violence in the run-up to the election as teachers were assaulted and chased out of or fled from their jobs, children’s education suffered as all schools were closed for a week, just three weeks before the school holidays, to host polling.

Among the victims of the political violence were the National Blood Transfusion Service’s mobile teams, caught up twice in politically-motivated violence, with the loss of all blood donated.[3] Ahead of expected further pre-election violence during which demand reportedly peaked on 5 March 2002,[4] the supply of blood was critical. The NTBS made repeated, unsuccessful, special appeals to its donors.

The organisation known as ‘Concerned Health Professionals’ advertised that

‘There are increasing numbers of people being seen and cared for with injuries sustained in politically-orchestrated violence. Victims of violence are being prevented from accessing health facilities in their localities… Sometimes the violence or threat of violence is directed at health professionals. This is intended to prevent them from caring for victims of political violence out of fear for their personal safety. Health workers who work at night feel especially fearful for their safety. The Ministry of health has failed to ensure the security of its staff and patients’.[5]

Religion and politics

Robert Mugabe succeeded in gaining the endorsement of the Anglican church hierarchy, led by Bishop Norbert Kunonga, and various apostolic sects already known to be affiliated to ZANU-PF.[6] But some attending a ‘prayer meeting’ in Bulawayo organised by Government’s youth ministry, were reportedly very angry when told by Vice-President Msika that God had ‘ordained’ Mugabe’s position and ‘does not support change of governments’.[7]

The other major churches and church groupings (including the National Pastors Conference, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe) roundly condemned political violence, inflammatory language, and dissociated themselves from such endorsement of any of the five candidates.

Catholics, Baptists and Methodists also deplored the government’s attempt to prevent them from distributing famine relief to all who needed it, as well as harassment of their personnel by ‘state security agents’.[8] In turn, Robert Mugabe recurrently denounced Archbishop Pius Ncube of the Bulawayo Catholic diocese: ‘We will respect him if he remains within the confines of the church, but once he shows his political tentacles and if those tentacles are harmful, we will cut them short’, he was quoted as saying, in a chilling reminder of the several death threats received by Ncube since the 2000 elections.[9]

The Jesuit Fathers and Brothers of Zimbabwe condemned adult political bullying and established sanctuaries for victims of violence and those in danger of torture, into which no weapons of any kind might be brought.[10] The Catholic Bishops Conference[11] and the Zimbabwe Council of churches both issued pastoral letters calling for politicians and especially political leaders to desist from ‘inflammatory and intimidatory statements’, ‘verbal violence’, ‘hate-language, slogans, songs and rhetoric that fan violence’, and physical violence itself.[12] These calls were clearly directed at the one party repeatedly guilty of this behaviour. The Presbyterian Church issued one of the later but most pointed statements. ‘Our whole electoral process seems intent on giving a distinct advantage to the ruling party (one party) and preventing a transparent election.’ While noting their differential responsibility for this violence, it called on all parties to cease ‘violence, intimidation and inflammatory language’, to accept the results and to use only legal and constitutional means to challenge them. It also called for ‘honest and responsible reporting from all sections of the media’, and on citizens to vote.[13]

In response, at Chivi growth point Robert Mugabe reportedly

‘castigated some of the white-led churches, which he said had joined forces with the MDC to fight the Government. He told the gathering that the Government had heard there were some churches which wanted the ZANU-PF Government removed from power. He said the Government was going to investigate and if the reports were found to be true, action would be taken against such churches’.[14]

A week later, the police arrested 11 organisers of an interdenominational peace march in Bulawayo.[15] Seventeen churches there had earlier objected to the state-controlled media ‘portrayal of some of our church leaders as puppets of foreign governments and institutions’ as well as the Public Order and Security Act, which caused them to ‘have to seek permission from the State to hold prayer meetings in public’.[16]

Recalling its use of traditional beliefs during the liberation struggle, ZANU-PF also sought ‘the spiritual intervention of Mbuya Nehanda to fight Britain’s intervention in the political affairs of the country through the opposition MDC’. Some Zimbabweans thought Nehanda and Kaguvi were angry at the suffering of the people, and therefore sent the drought. And ZANU-PF reportedly ‘murdered in cold blood’ a well-known spirit medium (svikiro) ‘accused of mobilising chiefs, headmen and other traditional leaders against President Mugabe’.[17] Mhondoro Dzodzimbahwe, speaking of behalf of its member mediums, was ‘outraged by this horrendous crime’ as well as ‘all politically-motivated murders that have taken place since 1980’, threatening that ‘the perpetrators of this evil act will themselves never know peace’ and invoking Kaguvi and Nehanda as having been killed for resisting policies the same as those now being perpetrated by ZANU-PF.[18] In effect, they publicly invoked traditional spiritual sanctions against ZANU-PF.

The drought developed concurrently with and became part of the election campaign as commentators publicly voiced popular concerns that the drought was ‘retribution’ for political ‘sins’.

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