Human Rights and Zimbabwe's Presidential Election: March 2002
A Special Report by the Research Unit
May, 2002

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background

The political run-up  

The political role of the military     

Pre-election opinion polls      

The first Special Report (published in January 2001) by the Research Unit of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum was entitled Human Rights and Zimbabwe’s June 2000 Election. We have deliberately repeated that thematic title for this, our fourth, Special Report.

Regrettably, not much has changed in the intervening 21 months. Every parliamentary by-election has yielded renewed political violence, most of which has been directed by the ruling party, ZANU-PF, against the Movement for Democratic Change. The fundamental political rights of Zimbabweans have again been massively assaulted, before, during and after the voting on 9-11 March 2002. In this report, we attempt systematically to document the numerous ways in which our political rights have been violated, not simply by violence.

As Zimbabwe faces up to its suspension from Commonwealth councils and international sanctions against its ostensibly re-elected leadership, we also address the political violations of our civil, social and economic rights much later, in Chapter 9. They may well, in the next year, overshadow the significance of the purely political transgressions, as a beleaguered regime has already begun to move against those citizens whom it regards as conspiring with foreigners against itself. It is tragic that political mismanagement has destroyed Zimbabwe’s previously productive economic base. It is an even worse abuse of human rights that state power has been and is being used against those citizens using their internationally-recognised right to organise dissent against the destruction of their lives and property.

At issue on 9-11 March 2002 was the election of the President of Zimbabwe, together with executive mayors for the cities of Harare and Chitungwiza, and a 45-ward Harare City Council.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (to which Zimbabwe is a signatory), states:

‘Article 21. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely-chosen representatives… The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.’

Neither the Constitution of Zimbabwe nor our electoral law protect these basic political rights adequately against manipulation. Far from guaranteeing the rights of voters, which might afford some constitutional protection against legal disenfranchisement and/or administrative inadequacy – both of which impaired Zimbabweans’ ostensible right to vote in the March 2002 presidential election – our Constitution deals only with the qualifications required to register as a voter. Schedule 3 section 3 notes, under ‘Qualifications and Disqualifications for Voters’:

‘(1) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph and to such residence qualifications as may be prescribed in the Electoral Law for inclusion on the electoral roll of a particular constituency, any person who has attained the age of eighteen years and who –

(a)   is a citizen of Zimbabwe; or

(b)   since the 31st of December, 1985, has been regarded by virtue of a written law as permanently resident in Zimbabwe;

shall be qualified for registration as a voter on the common roll.’

There are no constitutional guarantees that those entitled to be registered will actually be registered as voters, nor even of the right to cast a ballot, in any form of election. That problem has recently been exacerbated by Justice Makarau’s interpretation of the intention of the Legislature in its wording of Schedule 3 section 3 of the Constitution, against the MDC’s submission that it was ‘to grant universal suffrage to all adult citizens and permanent residents without regard to where these are resident’. In what has the capacity to become a devastating precedent[1] for the disenfranchisement of the homeless, she ruled in favour of ‘qualified suffrage’ for adult citizens and permanent residents ‘who can prove residence in a particular constituency or can satisfy the Registrar-General that they have a link with some other constituency in Zimbabwe by reason of place of origin, political affiliation, or otherwise’.

Nor are there any constitutional safeguards against registration being altered in ways that will deprive a voter of her or his vote on the election days. These fundamental protections of Zimbabweans’ ostensible political rights need urgent attention.

Background

Since Independence in 1980, ‘war veterans’ had become increasingly angry at their lack of remunerative integration into the economy by those who benefitted from their role in the liberation struggle. After extracting once-off Z$50 000 payments plus monthly pensions from Robert Mugabe in 1997, they started a low-key intrusion onto white-owned farms the following year. These attacks were stepped up dramatically after Zimbabweans rejected a government-sponsored new Constitution in February 2000. At that point, land redistribution became Mugabe’s main public concern. ‘Land is the economy and the economy is land’ was his main electioneering slogan for re-election in March 2002.

But the farm occupations, together with peasant impoverishment which impaired their capacity to buy farming inputs, had paralysed agricultural production in 2001. Zimbabwe went into the March 2002 presidential election with an acute shortage of staple foods and the distribution of grain controlled by ‘war veterans’. An extended dry spell had also developed after a normal start to the rainy season, but it will affect future, not present, consumption. By early February 2002, three children had already died of hunger in the Hwange district. By March, government had confiscated grain from farmers, travellers, fast-food chain warehouses, a starch-manufacturer,[2] a brewer,[3] at least one church[4] and Zambian cross-border traders[5] in an attempt to alleviate the critical food shortage caused by its ‘fast-track land resettlement’ policy. Confiscations, under Statutory Instrument 235A of 2001, were regarded by the Minister of State in Vice-President Msika’s Office (Olivia Muchena) on behalf of the Minister of Agriculture, as ‘supersed[ing] any contract that may have been entered into by farmers and traders’.[6]

Over 70% of the workforce was unemployed. Inflation was running at well over 116% pa. Narrow money supply had been growing at well over 120% pa since September 2001. Government had an overdraft with the Reserve Bank of over Z$14 billion. Domestic debt totalled well over Z$225 billion. Foreign debt stood at over US$1 billion. And a very long history of political violence had resulted in some 120 deaths since the Referendum of February 2000, when voters had rejected the President’s proposals for a new Constitution even more flawed than the one we still have.

These ills had all been generated in the 22-year ‘reign’ of 78-year-old Robert Mugabe, presiding over a ZANU-PF government first as Prime Minister (1980-87), then as executive State President (1987-2002). He was standing for re-election against four contenders for his seat. Morgan Tsvangirai stood for the official opposition Movement for Democratic Change. Shakespeare Maya represented the little-known National Alliance for Good Governance. The respective parties (ZANU and ZAPU) of the two independents (Wilson Kumbula and Paul Siwela[7]) had refused to endorse their candidacies, instead pledging their parties’ votes to Morgan Tsvangirai. Every Zimbabwean knew it was a two-horse race, and that ZANU-PF had failed in its attempts to split the opposition vote.

For Robert Mugabe the stakes in this election were extremely high. Amnesty International (2001:30) had called on the 58th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (meeting in Geneva from 18 March to 29 April 2002) to establish for Zimbabwe ‘a thorough investigation … through visits by the Special Rapporteurs on torture, the independence of judges and lawyers, the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions’. It had urged the Commission to adopt a resolution expressing concern at human rights violations in Zimbabwe, including the issue of impunity, and for the government to comply with its international human rights obligations, to ratify the international human rights instruments which it has not yet signed,[8] and to co-operate fully with the UN in its proposed investigation.[9] Zimbabwean civic groups (including the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform, National Constitutional Assembly, Transparency International – Zimbabwe, churches, Bulawayo Dialogue,[10] Imbovane Yamahlabazulu) had repeatedly called publicly for Mugabe’s arraignment before an international tribunal on charges of genocide, war crimes and other human rights abuses.[11] Such calls were not reported in the state-controlled media, despite Robert Mugabe himself being quoted, two weeks after nominations had closed, as being

‘aware that the British are planning to sponsor certain people to sue the Government or myself to prevent me from contesting the election and be removed from office the Milosevic way.’[12]

These calls were sufficiently serious that it was reported that President Obasanjo of Nigeria had asked the MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai for guarantees of good treatment for outgoing presidents.[13]

Wilfred Mhanda of the Zimbabwe Liberators’ Platform noted that continuing violence and human rights abuses would prevent a free and fair election.[14] Archbishop Pius Ncube of the Bulawayo Catholic diocese voiced the views of many when he said ‘this election will not be free and fair as long as pressure is exerted on the electorate to vote for a particular candidate… We are being denied the right to choose a candidate of our choice.’[15] But despite fears of massive rigging and evidence of widespread violence targetting the MDC parliamentarians and leadership at all levels, by February there was a palpable feeling that ZANU-PF had already lost the popular vote, that the party was disintegrating, and some of its members, if not preparing to ‘cross the floor’, were at least considering their post-election options should Robert Mugabe lose.

Many Zimbabwean voters who had not migrated, as economic or political refugees, were clearly disaffected. The first unmistakable signs of serious disaffection had appeared two years previously, with the clear rejection in February 2000 of the State’s constitutional proposals that would have strengthened the State’s executive presidency still further. Four months later, in June 2000, the voters removed ZANU-PF’s constitution-making majority by electing 57 MDC MPs who became the official opposition in a House of 150. (The previous Parliament had had three opposition members.) Even the 10 chiefs and the State President’s 20 personal appointees to Parliament no longer enabled ZANU-PF to amend the Constitution at will.

The National Constitutional Assembly had continued working on a new Constitution. Its first draft, published on 28 September 2001, was presented to its All-Stakeholders Conference on 1 December 2001, after two months of intensive discussion of the draft. The Conference made numerous changes to the draft, and the Final Draft appeared on 3 February 2002, reflecting much of what Zimbabweans had told the State they wanted in 1999. It was ‘presented to the government of Zimbabwe with a DEMAND that it be enacted into law’ (NCA 2002:1). This demand had already been rejected by government, so it was accompanied by another, that ‘on any future Constitution of Zimbabwe’, another Referendum be held. The police refused permission (under the Public Order and Security Act, POSA) for the planned NCA marches to present the draft to the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on 15 February 2002 and closed the NCA’s Mutare office after seizing posters, banners and a bag of mealie-meal, having found no ‘offensive weapons’ for which they were apparently searching.[16] Armed riot police broke up the Harare march and assaulted at least 15 of the 300-odd marchers, including an opposition MP.[17]

In a move regarded as legally ill-advised, the NCA filed a High Court application in an attempt to force Robert Mugabe’s government to accept the NCA’s Draft Constitution.[18] In his inaugural rally speech, the MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai pledged that his party’s top priority would be a new Constitution scrapping ‘the excessive powers of the Presidency’ and abolishing the 30 Parliamentary seats currently reserved for chiefs, Provincial Governors and other Presidential appointments.[19]

After the election, the NCA’s renewed pressure for a new Constitution was met by the arrest and detention, again under POSA, of the organisers and supporters of its 6 April national marches.

The political run-up

Half a dozen deaths among MPs had produced ongoing political fireworks in the ensuing by-elections after June 2000. The MDC mounted 39 electoral challenges to the June 2000 results, which Robert Mugabe initially tried to void using his power to amend the Electoral Act via subordinate legislation. The Supreme Court voided this attempt (for which former Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay paid with his job). Following High Court decisions, half a dozen seats were declared vacant. Appeals ensured that their incumbents did not have to leave the House immediately. The political atmosphere became increasingly tense and strained, as everyone’s nerves and patience frayed.

The MDC also attempted to impeach the State President, using constitutionally-enshrined Parliamentary procedures. The Speaker (Emmerson Mnangagwa) and the Leader of the House (Patrick Chinamasa), both unelected personal appointees of Robert Mugabe, ensured that the committee that was eventually formed never met, not even once. Popular anger grew at this subversion of peaceful, political options to resolve the country’s problem of rank bad governance.

Meanwhile, the ‘farm invasions’ which had marked the ruling party’s disapproval of the Referendum result, continued well beyond the Parliamentary elections and eventually turned into ‘fast-track resettlement’, ‘the third chimurenga’ and ‘hondo yeminda’– whichever term one chooses to describe the final blow to commercial agriculture in the struggling Zimbabwean economy. In due course, workplaces of various descriptions and residential homes were also ‘occupied’ by ‘war veterans’, some of whom were later sentenced by the courts on extortion charges. The speculation was that they failed to hand over to ZANU-PF the party’s appropriate share of the purloined funds.

Zimbabwe waited with bated breath for the final opportunity to resolve the political crisis once and for all. The Abuja Agreement of 7 September 2001 initially inspired hope, mainly among the naive. However, as the deadline of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Australia was deferred by five months to March 2002, Zimbabwe, as predicted, failed to meet its Abuja commitments. This failure was confirmed in the UNDP’s Interim Assessment of Zimbabwe’s Land Reform and Resettlement Programme.[20]  The eventual confirmation of the election dates (9-10 March 2002) came on 10 January 2002,[21] amid rapidly-escalating violence and threats of international sanctions on Robert Mugabe, his wife Grace and his close associates, and possible suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth.

In declining then to recommend Zimbabwe’s suspension, on 30 January 2002 the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG)[22] called for ‘an immediate end to violence and intimidation and that the police and army refrain from party political statements and activities’.[23] The threat of suspension hung over Zimbabwe at the CHOGM meeting in Brisbane from 2-5 March 2002, should its election the following weekend not be deemed to have been free and fair. Australia and Canada were reported to be pushing ‘for sanctions against Zimbabwe’ at the rescheduled CHOGM meeting, while the UK wanted our membership suspended.[24] All such decisions were deferred until immediately after the election. Should the Commonwealth observer group report adversely, recommendations on action were to be made by Australia, Nigeria and South Africa ‘in accordance with the Harare Commonwealth Declaration and the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme’. Although many Zimbabweans felt ‘terribly let down’ by the ‘predictable … completely misguided and treacherous show of solidarity’ between the SADC Commonwealth members in defence of Robert Mugabe, in fact Harare and Millbrook were important limiting parameters, particularly for a decisive result in favour of Morgan Tsvangirai which, by then, was very widely expected.

Zimbabwe had endorsed many international ‘best practice’ covenants with respect to elections and the role of free media therein. In the last quarter of 2001, Parliament deliberated the motion introduced by Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga (MDC, Glen Norah), calling upon her colleagues to

1.     Adopt the SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards for elections in the SADC region;

2.     Set up a Parliamentary Select Committee to work on a framework that will facilitate an electoral process that is worthy of the national integrity of our country.[25]

She was immediately applauded by one newly-elected ZANU-PF MP – who also blamed the opposition for electoral violence in his constituency. His colleagues, however, averred they were already part of the SADC process and regarded her proposals as inferring that existing Zimbabwean institutions had failed. They rejected her suggestion to set up a Parliamentary Select Committee. The debate was adjourned indefinitely.

This parliamentary disregard for their very own regional agreement clearly did not impress the SADC Parliamentary Forum Observer team, which drew attention to Zimbabwe’s failure to observe the arrangements it had signed up to, viz:

·         An independent election administration

·         Unimpeded freedom to campaign throughout the country

·         Freedom of association and expression

·         Electoral laws that provide for freedom of association and expression

·         Free and unimpeded access to voter’s rolls for inspection

·         Polling stations in public places that are neutral, such as schools, tents, mobile vehicles

·         Transparent ballot boxes instead of opaque wooden boxes

·         Impartial and professional conduct by all security forces

·         Free and adequate security for Presidential candidates during the election process

·         Equal and free access to state-owned media by all political parties

·         A code of conduct developed through consensus from all political parties to guide behaviour in the conduct of campaigns

·         Reasonable safeguards at political meetings, rallies, polling stations and party premises

·         Government recognition of the role of civil society, mainly in election monitoring and civic education.

Meanwhile, GenocideWatch had visited Zimbabwe in October 2001 to assess our situation. It revised its genocide warning for Zimbabwe to stage 6 – the final preparatory phase before genocide is actually carried out – and was quoted[26] as warning:

‘Mugabe must be put on notice that if political or genocidal massacres are committed by these militias or elements of the Zimbabwe armed forces, he will be held personally responsible. Zimbabwe’s leaders should be notified that if such massacres occur, the United States and EU will support armed intervention by a United Nations-authorised regional force, and President Mugabe and those who might perpetrate the crimes would be subject to prosecution.’

The political role of the military

Some high-ranking soldiers dismissed for allegedly supporting the MDC took the Zimbabwe National Army to court for unlawful and unconstitutional political discrimination. Substantial pay awards to the army and police shortly before the election caused concern. These awards were more than double those given to the civil service. It later transpired that only ‘foot soldiers’ of the ranks involved in assaults upon the civilian populations of major cities, not qualified technicians and professionals, received this pay increase. This discrimination caused considerable disaffection.[27] Some recipients of the full pay awards professed themselves disenchanted, since inflation had already rendered the increases insufficient to maintain expenditure at last year’s levels. And after the elections, there were reports that at least some of the increases had been reversed.

A special cause of anxiety, to Zimbabweans and foreign states and organisations alike, was the public statement on 9 January 2002 by the armed forces supremo, General Vitalis Zvinavashe. The ZCTU reportedly described it as ‘treasonous’,[28] while Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights more circumspectly reminded the nation in their public statement that ‘Any attempt to unlawfully overturn the Constitution constitutes treason’.[29] Speaking on behalf of services chiefs Constantine Chiwengwa (Zimbabwe National Army), Perence Shiri (Air Force of Zimbabwe), Augustine Chihuri (Zimbabwe Republic Police), Elisha Muzonzini (Central Intelligence Organisation) and Paradzai Zimondi (Zimbabwe Prison Service), Zvinavashe had said:

‘We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organisations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwe values, traditions and beliefs for thousands of lives lost in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence. We will not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people’.[30]

His statement was immediately condemned as unconstitutional and contradicted by more junior members of the Zimbabwe National Army, the Zimbabwe Republic Police and the Central Intelligence Organisation who reportedly alleged Zvinavashe’s statement had been ‘sanctioned’ by Robert Mugabe.[31] Zvinavashe was publicly defended by two ministers, Sydney Sekeremayi (defence)[32] and Patrick Chinamasa (justice), who was quoted as saying:

‘The statement by General Zvinavashe was long overdue. There was no way we could have a free and fair election and allow voters to vote freely and fairly when they had been poisoned to believe that the armed forces were turned against President Mugabe.’[33]

Public outrage was expressed, among others by the editor of the Zimbabwe Independent.[34]

‘A military command that openly tells the people of Zimbabwe that it will not honour their democratically-expressed wishes is one that immediately forfeits their confidence…’

All of Zimbabwe’s major opposition parties, including ZANU, condemned Zvinavashe’s statement.

Europe’s Council of Ministers

‘deplored the statement by the chief of the armed forces of Zimbabwe, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, on 9 January 2002, as a threat to overturn the democratic process if military commanders did not agree with the result of the presidential elections’.[35]

Two days after General Zvinavashe’s statement, South African Presidential spokesman Bheki Khumalo was quoted as saying

‘If indeed these allegations are true [that Zvinvashe had made this statement], then indeed that situation is not acceptable to us. You cannot have a situation where the security forces are trying to pre-empt an election.’[36]

Desmond Tutu expressed himself saddened by Zimbabwe’s slide into anarchy under Robert Mugabe’s disregard of the rule of law and, later, his disregard of the democratic will of the people.[37]

Yet South Africa’s official position seemed ambiguous and shifting, although it had prepared a disused SADF base near Messina to receive Zimbabwean refugees.[38] On 8 February, President Mbeki publicly appealed to Robert Mugabe to stop the violence and ‘let the people speak through the ballot box’.[39] It was ‘critically important’, he was quoted as saying, ‘that the election is seen by the Zimbabweans to be free and fair, because if it is not then people will contest the result’. Yet by mid-February, as the violence escalated, Mbeki reportedly

‘did not believe that the Zimbabwean population has been intimidated, whatever the direction, to such an extent that they will not be able, if we get the conditions rights between now and election day, to take a decision which is truly their decision’.[40]

South African civil servants visited Harare in mid-February, apparently to investigate ‘negative media reports on Zimbabwe’s preparation for the presidential poll’. They reportedly discussed ‘mutual assistance between the ESC and its South African counterpart’, and were quoted in the state-controlled press as saying later ‘You have put our minds to rest. What you are doing here in preparation for the election is similar to what we also do in South Africa.’[41]

The USA reportedly asked Robert Mugabe to repudiate Zvinavashe’s statement.[42] He did not. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, Lorne Craner, visited Harare to gain first-hand knowledge of Zimbabwe’s current situation on which political decisions on targetted sanctions were to be based. During his mid-January visit, Craner witnessed ‘an assault on the rule of law … an assault on the opposition political parties … an assault on civil society, including the media’.[43] Senator Russ Feingold, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was later issued a visa to visit Zimbabwe before the election, but this was withdrawn six days after being issued.[44] The USA announced its own ‘smart sanctions’ a few days after the EU had imposed their own, on the grounds that the violent and intimidatory presidential election campaign was occurring under restrictive election and media laws.[45] Mechanisms were explored to freeze individual and possibly corporate (meaning ZANU-PF) assets.

Even SADC took exception to Zvinavashe’s statement, despite its later apparently meek compliance with Zimbabwean government views on most pre-electoral issues. SADC’s support for Zimbabwe’s incumbent president was, the MDC alleged, a result of their being ‘grossly misinformed’ by ZANU-PF leaders inter alia about the public and parliamentary opposition to the new security, electoral and media legislation, and about the political violence.[46]

Within SADC, unlike Botswana and Mocambique, Namibia seemed especially disinclined to see any political deterioration in Zimbabwe and was not reported to have commented on Zvinavashe’s statement. Their chief election observer reportedly described the political violence as ‘exaggerated’ and thought voter education (of which, by the end of February, there had been none, officially, from the ESC) had placed the majority of Zimbabweans ‘beyond intimidation’.[47] The sole Namibian member of the Commonwealth Observer Team dissociated herself from its negative assessment.

The Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) warned in its 11 January report that rigging had been underway for some time and a fraudulent result would not be recognised.[48] The ICG was later attacked in the state-controlled press for ‘advocating civil disobedience’ and calling ‘for more illegal radio broadcasts’.[49] A few days before polling, ICG called on the international community to inform the government that a fraudulent result would not be accepted internationally, in order to prevent the risk of widespread domestic unrest and regional instability.[50]

Pre-election opinion polls

Eighteen months before the presidential election,

‘a survey of 1 200 Zimbabweans by the Afrobarometer research network reportedly found us to be the most dissatisfied country in the region regarding our politics.[51] Only 18% were satisfied. 38% did not regard Parliament[52] as a serious public institution. 55% stated Zimbabwe was not democratic, while 71% preferred a functioning democracy to any other form of government. 75% distrusted the State President to do what is right for Zimbabwe and even more (78%) disapproved of executive presidential rule’ (Cheater 2001:72).

Later information reported from the Afrobarometer Network noted that less than 20% had said they trusted Robert Mugabe ‘to any degree at all’ and only 3% had expressed any degree of satisfaction with his management of the economy.[53]

The Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) published its January 2002 survey of 1 693 responses from all over Zimbabwe except Mashonaland Central, where war veterans confiscated all 138 questionnaires from the 10 researchers whom they unlawfully detained and tortured. Nationwide, three-fifths refused to divulge their preference for president, 20% openly opted for Morgan Tsvangirai, just over 10% for Robert Mugabe. Only in Manicaland did these proportions change – to only 42,4% unwilling to select, with 36,7% opting for Tsvangirai and 10,1% for Mugabe.

Of particular interest were the preferences in Mashonaland East and West, where 7,1% and 9,0% would have voted for Robert Mugabe, compared to 11,2% and 20,0% for Morgan Tsvangirai; and in Matabeleland North and South, where 21,7% and 22,1% said they intended to vote for Mugabe, compared to 12,0% and 5,3% for Tsvangirai. There was no reason to doubt the honesty of the Mashonaland voters, not least because most of them also said that ZANU (Ndonga) members should vote for the MDC rather than ZANU-PF or even ZANU (Ndonga) itself. However, the Matabeleland answers, given Gukurahundi and past voting patterns, were probably defensive.

This poll also revealed Zimbabweans’ top priority for good governance (62%), compared to employment and land. Only Mashonaland East and Masvingo (the latter long the most land-short province) thought land ranked first. In short, the details of this survey strongly suggested that Mugabe would have enormous problems even in ZANU-PF’s heartland, especially because the vast majority of respondents were satisfied that their vote was secret.

It was unclear whether the MPOI poll was the source of overseas reports stating polls had shown that Mugabe would get only 25-30% of the vote if the poll was free and fair, but the Americans at least were well aware of the rigging of the voters roll,[54] even if they vastly underestimated its potential significance.

These poll results clearly unnerved ZANU-PF, which was reported to have commissioned a poll to counter the MPOI survey.[55] Two months before the election even ZANU-PF was publicly reported to be expecting to lose the Presidency.[56] And perhaps some of their members were even actively working to achieve that result. Three southern provinces threatened not to campaign for Robert Mugabe, and it was unclear whether they were the provinces lacking party structures a mere two months from the election.[57]

Despite the hunger and the anger, there was a palpable sense of hope as the count-down to voting began. After the Nomination Court sat, the possibilities of candidate assassination or imprisonment receded, though not completely. As well-briefed international observers asked searching questions of electoral officials and some judges struggled to keep the legal playing field reasonably even, some attempts at mass disenfranchisement failed. Despite impressive attendances at ZANU-PF rallies, practically everyone realised that its real support was waning. Even in ZANU-PF’s Mashonaland heartland (Kadoma, Marondera) but most frequently in Manicaland, people whose attendance had been enforced at their rallies walked out while the State President was speaking.[58] Even their monopoly over what was sometimes called the ‘ZANU-PF Broadcasting Corporation’, guaranteed ZANU-PF manipulative control only over rural voters’ views in areas where other sources of information were excluded.

The outcome then seemed predictable – a dramatic swing of the political pendulum in another landslide popular vote even though, four days away from voting, ZANU-PF’s external affairs boss reportedly told SATV’s Special Assignment that there would be ‘mayhem in the region’ if Zimbabweans voted Tsvangirai into the presidency.[59]  And, unlike June 2000, the violence did not cease completely during the poll, before resuming even more vigorously afterwards.

And yet, despite voter disbelief and rejection of the result as massively rigged, Robert Mugabe was officially returned as Zimbabwe’s State President. There had been pre-polling speculation that he would retire shortly after winning the election,[60] but that seemed highly unlikely to those who had wanted a democratic resolution of the country’s problems. Zimbabweans simply despaired and went into an extended national depression.

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