In August 1981, 106 Koreans arrived to train the new brigade, which Mugabe said was to be used to "deal with dissidents and any other trouble in the country". Even by August 1981, there had been very little internal unrest. Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, asked why this brigade was necessary, when the country already had a police force to handle internal problems. He suggested Mugabe would use it to build a one party state.

Mugabe replied by saying dissidents should "watch out", and further announced the brigade would be called "Gukurahundi", which means the rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains.

5 Brigade was drawn from 3500 ex-ZANLA troops at Tongogara Assembly Point. There were a few ZIPRA troops in the unit for a start, but they were withdrawn before the end of the training. It seems there were also some foreigners in the unit, possibly Tanzanians. The training of 5 Brigade lasted until September 1982, when Minister Sekeramayi announced training was complete.

The first Commander of 5 Brigade was Colonel Perence Shiri. 5 Brigade was different to all other army units, in that it was not integrated into the army. It was answerable only to the Prime Minister, and not to the normal army command structures. Their codes, uniforms, radios and equipment were not compatible with other army units. Their most distinguishing feature in the field was their red berets. 5 Brigade seemed to be a law unto themselves once in the field.

Deployment of 5 Brigade - Matabeleland North, 1983
In late January 1983, 5 Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland North. Within weeks, they had murdered more than two thousand civilians, beaten thousands more, and destroyed hundreds of homesteads. Their impact on the communities they passed through was shocking.

Most of the dead were shot in public executions, often after being forced to dig their own graves in front of family and fellow villagers. The largest number of dead in a single killing involved the deliberate shooting of 62 young men and women on the banks of the Cewale River, Lupane, on 5 March 1983. Seven survived with gunshot wounds, the other 55 died. Another way 5 Brigade killed large groups of people was to burn them alive in huts. They did this in Tsholotsho and also in Lupane.

At the same time as 5 Brigade was sent into the area, the Government had introduced a strict curfew on the region. This prevented anybody from entering or leaving the area, banned all forms of transport and prevented movement in the region from dusk to dawn. A food curfew was also in force, with stores being closed. People caught using bicycles or donkey carts were shot. No journalists were allowed near the region. This situation meant that it was very hard to get news of events out of the region, and hard to judge the truth of the early accounts. However, as some people managed to flee the area, stories of the atrocities began to spread.

Targeting civilians
During these early weeks, 5 Brigade behaved in a way that shows they had clearly been trained to target civilians. Wherever they went, they would routinely round up dozens, or even hundreds, of civilians and march them at gun point to a central place, like a school or bore-hole. There they would be forced to sing Shona songs praising ZANU-PF, at the same time being beaten with sticks. These gatherings usually ended with public executions. Those killed could be ex-ZIPRAs, ZAPU officials, or anybody chosen at random, including women. Large numbers of soldiers were involved in these events, sometimes as many as two hundred, and often forty or more.

It is clear 5 Brigade was following orders when they targeted civilians in this way, because the pattern is similar throughout the regions affected.

Early response to events
In spite of the curfew, news spread and by early February the first efforts were being made to tell everyone what was happening and to get the Government to stop 5 Brigade activities. These efforts were met with denial on the part of Government officials. Minister Sekeramayi claimed the foreign press was "spreading malicious stories about the so-called atrocities". In March, officials from CCJP met with Prime Minister Mugabe, showing him evidence of atrocities. Mugabe made a public statement a few weeks later, on 6 April, denying atrocities and accusing his critics of being "a band of Jeremiahs". However, a few days later, the curfew was lifted and it was agreed atrocities would be looked into.

The Government continued to make contradictory statements during these months, sometimes seeming to express regret at atrocities, and at other times clearly seeming to encourage them. The Minister of State Security in charge of CIO, Emmerson Mnangagwa, told a Victoria Falls rally in March 1983 that the Government could choose to burn down "all the villages infested with dissidents". He added that: "the campaign against dissidents can only succeed if the infrastructure that nurtures them is destroyed."

5 Brigade: April to December 1983
By the end of April the curfew had been lifted. 5 Brigade also changed their behaviour, and the mass killings stopped. Random killings and beatings on a small scale continued throughout the year, except for a month midyear when 5 Brigade was withdrawn, for retraining.

Deployment of 5 Brigade - Matabeleland South, 1984
In January 1984, 5 Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland South. Once more, this coincided with a strict curfew. However, this time the curfew was very strictly applied to food supplies, in addition to restrictions on transport and movement around the region. It was the third successive year of drought, and people had no food apart from drought relief from donors and what they could buy in stores. All drought relief food was stopped, and all stores were closed.

The Government's reasoning was that if there was no food, the dissidents would starve. However, there were no more than 200 dissidents in the curfew region, and it was the 400 000 civilians who suffered most. They were brought to the brink of complete starvation.

5 Brigade used a more sophisticated strategy to intimidate the civilian population in 1984. In addition to the food curfew, thousands of civilians were detained and transported to large detention centres where they were then tortured. This meant that beatings and killings in the village setting were less common than before. In these big camps, people did not know each other, which makes it hard to work out how many people were affected at this stage. At Bhalagwe camp in Matobo District, several thousand civilians were detained at any one time, and there were daily deaths in this camp. The dead were thrown down Antelope Mine, and in 1992, bones were taken out of the mine shaft. People in the region claim there are many other mines with bones in them.

5 Brigade: Retraining
Late in 1984, 5 Brigade was withdrawn for intensive retraining. When they were re-deployed they seemed to behave much better: the proof of this is that there are few complaints against 5 Brigade on record after 1984. This makes it hard to say where they were deployed in 1985 and what they were doing. The last recorded complaint against 5 Brigade is that they tortured several groups of young men at Dhlamini Rest Camp in late 1985. In 1986, 5 Brigade was finally withdrawn and had conventional military training under the British Military Advisory Team. The Brigade was then disbanded and its members attached to other brigades.

Exceptions to the rule
Not every member of 5 Brigade took part in the atrocities. There was a commander in Lupane who refused to commit atrocities, and others who on rare occasions apologised for bad deeds by the men under their command. There are also several reports of ex-members of 5 Brigade who are now severely troubled by the deeds they committed. Some have tried to approach communities they harmed to seek forgiveness. However, victims have so far not felt in a position to forgive what happened.

Official reasoning for using 5 Brigade
People who support the Government's use of 5 Brigade against civilians say that this strategy "brought peace very, very quickly" (Lt Col Lionel Dyke, commander of Paratroopers, 1983-84). This implies that without the massive killings and beatings of civilians, the dissidents would not have been brought under control. This argument is not supported by events. There were actually more murders by dissidents after 5 Brigade was withdrawn than before. 5 Brigade made the situation worse in every way. It was not 5 Brigade, but the signing of a political agreement, the Unity Accord, that brought an end to the violence.

Lasting impact of 5 Brigade in Matabeleland
One of the saddest outcomes of the 1980s violence is that people in Matabeleland believe themselves to have been the target of a war not against dissidents, but against the Ndebele and ZAPU. This was the result of the 5 Brigade being Shona-speaking, and targeting any Ndebele-speaker including women and children. The 5 Brigade would say things like "all Ndebeles are dissidents". Rapes were seen as an attempt to create a generation of Shona babies.

While 5 Brigade failed to change people's support for ZAPU, which was re-elected in 1985 in Matabeleland, people were very clear that they were also being targeted for political reasons. People who talk about 5 Brigade now will often say: "You can never have another political party in Zimbabwe or you will be punished." This is the message they have learnt.

People also remain afraid that the violence of the 1980s can be repeated at any time in Matabeleland. Having once experienced violence that was totally unexpected, which to this day cannot be explained, and having never had an apology or a guarantee that it will not happen again, it is not surprising people remain afraid.

"We can still be eliminated at any time...This wound is huge and deep...The liberation war was painful, but it had a purpose, it was planned face to face. The war that followed was much worse. It was fearful, unforgettable and unacknowledged".