| A Consolidated Report on the Food Riots 19 - 23 January, 1998 |
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Contents « Prev Next » 7. Conclusions and recommendations Firstly, as stated in the initial report, it remains evident that in Zimbabwe there is a highly volatile and unstable social environment. This stems from gross discontent with very harsh economic conditions and massive levels of unemployment. As we hope we have demonstrated, the disturbances were predictable and, indeed were predicted by many commentators. More recent analyses of the Zimbabwean situation make many of the same points as we have in our analysis of the background. 40 Unless these problems are properly addressed, there is bound to be increasing levels of social instability.Secondly, in this sort of environment, ill-conceived measures by Government that worsen economic suffering will inevitably lead to some sort of backlash. As can be seen from the analysis of the economic and other factors preceding the Food Riots, these factors have strong implications for public order. It is noteworthy that there have been riots subsequent to the Food Riots, and that these riots were determined in the main by economic factors and the Governments ill-conceived policy in dealing with the economic issues. Thirdly, whilst the Government has the duty to maintain law and order, if Government responds to public dissatisfaction with brutal repression or unrestrained and indiscriminate use of force, then it is likely that there will be increasing tension and, probably, counter violence. Even where there is unrest and disorder, there are still basic internationally recognised constraints on the use of force to ensure that fundamental rights are not unnecessarily and unjustifiably violated. Here it is important to note that the Zimbabwe Republic Police has made no attempt to investigate abuses, and the single case that we have been able to follow up indicates rather a reluctance, even obstructiveness, by the ZRP to investigate. Fourthly, these international instruments categorically lay down that political and civil unrest may not be used as justifications for human rights violations. One of the underlying reasons for this approach is that if human rights violations are permissible during times of civil unrest many human rights abuses will be likely to be committed and this will only serve to worsen the situation rather than solving the problems. The use of excessive force is thus not only illegal, but will also lead to more people feeling aggrieved, especially where innocent persons are affected. For the same reasons, basic safeguards to ensure that persons brought before the courts are fairly dealt with must not be dispensed with during times of civil unrest. Fifthly, on 9 December 1997, the police used indiscriminate force against demonstrators, who at least initially were exercising their lawful right to demonstrate peacefully. Rather than facilitating peaceful protest, the police created the very conditions that allowed criminal elements to exploit the situation to engage in unlawful acts. However, when these unlawful activities occurred, the police obviously had to respond and take appropriate action. Appropriate action was not, however, the use of indiscriminate or unrestrained force as advocated by the responsible Minister. The use of inappropriate force against legitimate protest probably created strong resentment against the ZRP, and this was another factor that led to the escalation of violence in January 1998. However, when the Food Riots started on 19 January 1998, the law enforcement agencies were faced with the unenviable task of trying to contain large scale violence and to protect people and property from attacks. It is evident that the police did not have the capacity to contain the situation and that additional resources had to be called in. The Government was thus forced to call in the army. This led to the situation being brought under control, but not before a number of people had been killed or injured by the use of firearms, some of whom were innocent civilians. Regrettably the Minister of Home Affairs, by publicly stating that the police would not hesitate to shoot people engaged in looting or trouble-making, seemed to send a message to the law enforcement agencies that they should use maximum force on an indiscriminate basis. Thus instead of fatal force being reserved as a last resort measure where there was no other option, the impression was created that shooting would be resorted to whether or not it was necessary and justified. Sixthly, the involvement of the military in the aftermath of the Food Riots was very questionable. Soldiers are not trained to investigate crime. The nature of their training makes them entirely unsuitable for use in this role. The reports received clearly establish that army personnel took very brutal measures against people. Some of this brutality was aimed at forcing people to confess to looting; some was aimed at intimidating people. After people were beaten, there were often verbal warnings that they would receive even worse treatment if they caused any further trouble. It was not only the army that used these strong arm tactics. There have been many reports of police officers unlawfully using beatings and torture to obtain information about the whereabouts of looted property and to extract confessions of looting. The police and the army used dragnet methods to try to locate looted property and those responsible for this. In the worst affected areas house to house searches were conducted without warrants: this is confirmed by the cases being represented by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, and also by the reports from the residents of Mabvuku. Whilst this may have led to the arrest of some wrongdoers, it also resulted in the harassment of many persons who had not been involved in any looting. Arrests were also made on a dragnet basis leading to many innocent persons being unlawfully arrested and detained together with the guilty. As can be seen from the analysis of the Court data, most people (72%) were discharged as the evidence could not sustain a prosecution. The dragnet approach was bad policing, and even if this could be laid at the door of the military, it remains the responsibility of the State to ensure that responsible and effective policing occurs in all situations. Seventhly, the use of such methods, and the hurried processing of some of the cases through the courts, has also created a considerable risk of miscarriages of justice. The whole process of justice seems to have been undermined by the failure to deal with these cases using the ordinary legal rules and principles, and the allegations of political interference in the process of justice require detailed examination to ensure that no person was unfairly charged or, more importantly, incorrectly sentenced, especially on warned and cautioned statements obtained under duress. As was seen above, there are prima facie grounds for accepting that statements were obtained under duress and even under torture. As a result the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum wishes to repeat the recommendations made earlier in the report published on 10 March 1998: 1. Commission of Inquiry 2. Parliamentary Committee 3. Compensation 4. Review of proceedings against those charged with unlawful violence or looting 5. Criminal proceedings against perpetrators 6. Compensation for losses to businesses In conclusion, we would wish to point out that it is unacceptable for the Government to avoid any inquiry. The basis of a stable and democratic society requires that all actions of the Government be open to public scrutiny, especially where events have led to loss of life and widespread civil disturbance as is the case in the Food Riots. It is insufficient for Government or any of its agencies to merely assert that the principle of minimum force has been obeyed without testing this assertion in an open and public manner. Zimbabwe is in crisis, and it is incumbent upon the Government to take the steps to reduce both crisis and the conditions for crisis. Government is not the law, nor is it above the law, and it should set the example to the nation of open criticism by public inquiry.
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