A Consolidated Report on the Food Riots
19 - 23 January, 1998


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7. Conclusions and recommendations
The conclusions and recommendations outlined in the report published on 10 March 1998 remain as relevant today as then, and the results of this more detailed report merely vindicate these earlier views.39

Firstly, as stated in the initial report, it remains evident that in Zimbabwe there is a highly volatile and unstable social environment. This stems from gross discontent with very harsh economic conditions and massive levels of unemployment. As we hope we have demonstrated, the disturbances were predictable and, indeed were predicted by many commentators. More recent analyses of the Zimbabwean situation make many of the same points as we have in our analysis of the background.40 Unless these problems are properly addressed, there is bound to be increasing levels of social instability.

Secondly, in this sort of environment, ill-conceived measures by Government that worsen economic suffering will inevitably lead to some sort of backlash. As can be seen from the analysis of the economic and other factors preceding the Food Riots, these factors have strong implications for public order. It is noteworthy that there have been riots subsequent to the Food Riots, and that these riots were determined in the main by economic factors and the Government’s ill-conceived policy in dealing with the economic issues.

Thirdly, whilst the Government has the duty to maintain law and order, if Government responds to public dissatisfaction with brutal repression or unrestrained and indiscriminate use of force, then it is likely that there will be increasing tension and, probably, counter violence. Even where there is unrest and disorder, there are still basic internationally recognised constraints on the use of force to ensure that fundamental rights are not unnecessarily and unjustifiably violated. Here it is important to note that the Zimbabwe Republic Police has made no attempt to investigate abuses, and the single case that we have been able to follow up indicates rather a reluctance, even obstructiveness, by the ZRP to investigate.

Fourthly, these international instruments categorically lay down that political and civil unrest may not be used as justifications for human rights violations. One of the underlying reasons for this approach is that if human rights violations are permissible during times of civil unrest many human rights abuses will be likely to be committed and this will only serve to worsen the situation rather than solving the problems. The use of excessive force is thus not only illegal, but will also lead to more people feeling aggrieved, especially where innocent persons are affected. For the same reasons, basic safeguards to ensure that persons brought before the courts are fairly dealt with must not be dispensed with during times of civil unrest.

Fifthly, on 9 December 1997, the police used indiscriminate force against demonstrators, who at least initially were exercising their lawful right to demonstrate peacefully. Rather than facilitating peaceful protest, the police created the very conditions that allowed criminal elements to exploit the situation to engage in unlawful acts. However, when these unlawful activities occurred, the police obviously had to respond and take appropriate action. Appropriate action was not, however, the use of indiscriminate or unrestrained force as advocated by the responsible Minister. The use of inappropriate force against legitimate protest probably created strong resentment against the ZRP, and this was another factor that led to the escalation of violence in January 1998.

However, when the Food Riots started on 19 January 1998, the law enforcement agencies were faced with the unenviable task of trying to contain large scale violence and to protect people and property from attacks. It is evident that the police did not have the capacity to contain the situation and that additional resources had to be called in. The Government was thus forced to call in the army. This led to the situation being brought under control, but not before a number of people had been killed or injured by the use of firearms, some of whom were innocent civilians. Regrettably the Minister of Home Affairs, by publicly stating that the police would not hesitate to shoot people engaged in looting or trouble-making, seemed to send a message to the law enforcement agencies that they should use maximum force on an indiscriminate basis. Thus instead of fatal force being reserved as a last resort measure where there was no other option, the impression was created that shooting would be resorted to whether or not it was necessary and justified.

Sixthly, the involvement of the military in the aftermath of the Food Riots was very questionable. Soldiers are not trained to investigate crime. The nature of their training makes them entirely unsuitable for use in this role. The reports received clearly establish that army personnel took very brutal measures against people. Some of this brutality was aimed at forcing people to confess to looting; some was aimed at intimidating people. After people were beaten, there were often verbal warnings that they would receive even worse treatment if they caused any further trouble. It was not only the army that used these strong arm tactics. There have been many reports of police officers unlawfully using beatings and torture to obtain information about the whereabouts of looted property and to extract confessions of looting. The police and the army used dragnet methods to try to locate looted property and those responsible for this.

In the worst affected areas house to house searches were conducted without warrants: this is confirmed by the cases being represented by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, and also by the reports from the residents of Mabvuku. Whilst this may have led to the arrest of some wrongdoers, it also resulted in the harassment of many persons who had not been involved in any looting. Arrests were also made on a dragnet basis leading to many innocent persons being unlawfully arrested and detained together with the guilty. As can be seen from the analysis of the Court data, most people (72%) were discharged as the evidence could not sustain a prosecution. The dragnet approach was bad policing, and even if this could be laid at the door of the military, it remains the responsibility of the State to ensure that responsible and effective policing occurs in all situations.

Seventhly, the use of such methods, and the hurried processing of some of the cases through the courts, has also created a considerable risk of miscarriages of justice. The whole process of justice seems to have been undermined by the failure to deal with these cases using the ordinary legal rules and principles, and the allegations of political interference in the process of justice require detailed examination to ensure that no person was unfairly charged or, more importantly, incorrectly sentenced, especially on warned and cautioned statements obtained under duress. As was seen above, there are prima facie grounds for accepting that statements were obtained under duress and even under torture.

As a result the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum wishes to repeat the recommendations made earlier in the report published on 10 March 1998:

1. Commission of Inquiry
It is necessary for Government to set up, as soon as possible, an independent Commission of Inquiry headed by a High Court Judge to investigate these allegations of human rights violations. In the interests of transparency and accountability the findings of this Commission must be made public. We would note here that this call has been additionally made by the United Nations Human Rights Committee
41, and we wish to endorse the recommendations of this Committee.

2. Parliamentary Committee
Pending the setting up of such a Commission, the organisations request Parliament to establish its own Committee to look into these allegations and report its findings to Parliament. In conducting these investigations the Parliamentary Committee should enlist the assistance of the Ombudsman’s office which now has jurisdiction to investigate allegations of human rights abuses on the part of members of the police, army and prison service. Although the Ombudsman may only investigate when complaints have been made to that office, the proposed Parliamentary Committee would be able to refer some of the complainants to the Ombudsman’s office so that their complaints can be investigated by personnel in this office.

3. Compensation
Following these inquiries arrangements must be made for compensation to be awarded to all persons found to have suffered human rights abuses without those persons having to bring claims in the courts. Government must also take stern disciplinary action against all those who are proven to have perpetrated human rights abuses to send a clear signal that this sort of misconduct will not be tolerated.

4. Review of proceedings against those charged with unlawful violence or looting
In respect of those who are alleged to have engaged in unlawful violence the law must continue to take its course. However these cases must be dealt with according to the ordinary rules of procedure and evidence which are there to ensure that accused persons receive fair trials. Any cases that were hurriedly processed through the courts in the emotionally charged atmosphere following upon the food riots must be thoroughly reviewed to ensure that no miscarriages of justice have occurred. The sentences in these cases must also be carefully scrutinised to ensure that they were fair and not disproportionate, taking into account the all the relevant factors that have a bearing upon sentence, including the fact that the criminal action may have been an expression of anger and frustration about harsh economic conditions. On the other hand, more deterrent sentences are obviously appropriate for hooligans and criminals who simply took advantage of the troubled situation to commit crimes.

5. Criminal proceedings against perpetrators
As recommended by the United Nations Human Rights Committee, criminal proceedings should be brought against all those who have committed gross human rights violations. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum endorses this view, and further points out that Zimbabwe has a very poor record of dealing with the perpetrators of such violations. The Government needs to send a strong signal that human rights violations will not be tolerated, that all perpetrators will be brought to justice, and, by so doing, make it clear to the country as a whole that it is seriously committed to the defence of human rights and the principle that no person is above the law.

6. Compensation for losses to businesses
Last but certainly not least, mechanisms must be established to ensure that businesspersons who suffered financial loss as a result of the riots receive compensation or at least soft loans to allow them to re-establish their businesses.

In conclusion, we would wish to point out that it is unacceptable for the Government to avoid any inquiry. The basis of a stable and democratic society requires that all actions of the Government be open to public scrutiny, especially where events have led to loss of life and widespread civil disturbance as is the case in the Food Riots. It is insufficient for Government or any of its agencies to merely assert that the principle of minimum force has been obeyed without testing this assertion in an open and public manner. Zimbabwe is in crisis, and it is incumbent upon the Government to take the steps to reduce both crisis and the conditions for crisis. Government is not the law, nor is it above the law, and it should set the example to the nation of open criticism by public inquiry.


  1. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (1998), Human Rights in Troubled Times: An Initial Report on Human Rights Abuses During and After Food Riots in January 1998.
  2. Conflict Revention Network (1998), Zimbabwe: A Conflict Study of a Country without Direction, SWP-CPN Briefing Paper, STIFTUNG ISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK- CONFLICT PREVENTION NETWORK.
  3. UN HIGH COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS(1998), UN Human Rights Committee: Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Zimbabwe

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