Politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe 2000-2001
A report on the campaign of political repression conducted by the Zimbabwean Government under the guise of carrying out land reform
August 2001


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6. Role of Government, "war veterans" and security agencies

6.1 Government

Some members of the Mugabe Government have tried to imply that the Government has not been responsible for the violence that has afflicted the country. They maintain that none of the violence has been State sponsored, State directed or State organised. All the evidence, however, points to Mugabe authorising and encouraging the use of violence to prevent the MDC from winning political power through the ballot box.71 The 77-year-old President,72 who has headed the Government for over two decades, seems determined to retain power at all costs.

The violence started in early 2000 with the farm invasions, which were organised by the Government and its security agencies. Since then, ZANU (PF) has been directly behind all the violence against the MDC. The President and many other ZANU (PF) officials have repeatedly incited violence against the MDC. Many of these officials have helped organise the violence and have participated in it. Many others have condoned it through their silence.

6.2 "War veterans"

Mugabe’s chief agency of violence against his political opponents has been and continues to be a small core group of "war veterans"73 who are fanatically loyal to him. This group operates militias comprising ZANU (PF) youths and other ZANU (PF) supporters, most of whom are not war veterans. The group leaders have repeatedly stated that they will use violence to ensure the MDC never assumes power in Zimbabwe, as they regard it as a front for the protection of white minority interests. They have also vowed to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that Mugabe wins the Presidential Election in 2002.74 The ruling party finances their operations and the security agencies supply them with arms. The leading members of this group of "war veterans" are Joseph Chinotimba and, until his recent death, Chenjerai Hunzvi.75

Hunzvi was a Polish-trained medical doctor who claimed to have played a prominent role in the liberation struggle; several war veterans have stated that these claims were false. He was accused of fraudulent practices.76 His ascent to power began in 1997, when he led protests that forced Mugabe to grant war veterans lavish pensions. These unbudgeted payments drove up inflation and pushed the economy into a downward spiral. After Mugabe’s defeat in the constitutional referendum, Hunzvi’s "war veterans" were asked to campaign on behalf of ZANU (PF) in the General Election. Hunzvi readily accepted this task, saying: "All revolutions require violence… No-one can stop the revolution we have started." Prior to the election, his surgery in Harare was used as a centre for torturing numerous MDC supporters (see 3.3). His campaign to be elected as an MP was characterised by extreme violence. He organised the farm invasions and played a prominent role in the violent by-election campaigns in Marondera West and Bikita West and mayoral elections in Masvingo (see 4.4).

Chinotimba, a war veteran, is a low-level employee in the Harare City Council. He became Hunzvi’s right hand and has played a pivotal role in the farm invasions, styling himself the Commander in Chief of Farm Invasions. In November 2000 he led a group of "war veterans" in storming the Supreme Court to protest against the court’s rulings on land reform and to demand the resignation of Chief Justice Gubbay (see 5.3). He accompanied Hunzvi in the campaigns in Marondera West, Bikita West and Masvingo. He is currently facing charges for attempting to kill a female MDC supporter by shooting her twice.77 He has repeatedly breached the bail conditions set by the court when he was remanded out of custody on this charge.

The rise of the "war veterans" to their current position of power has been fostered throughout by the Government and the ruling party:

  • In early 2000, ZANU (PF) allocated the "war veterans" Z$20 million to use in their campaign for the ruling party in the General Election. They formed militias composed of ZANU (PF) supporters, mostly unemployed youths, and paid the recruits for their violent activities. ZANU (PF) provided transport and other necessary support, and personnel from the CIO, the army and the police participated or assisted in the operations undertaken by the "war veterans";
  • After the General Election, ZANU (PF) provided the "war veterans" with two floors of a Government building in Harare, from which to conduct their operations;
  • In September 2000, ZANU (PF) announced that the "war veterans" would be brought into the army as a reserve force;
  • In October 2000, Mugabe granted an amnesty to all perpetrators of violence in the period leading up to the General Election, except those who had killed or raped.78 The main beneficiaries of this amnesty were the "war veterans". This fortified their belief that they were above the law and they became almost untouchable by the police unless ZANU (PF) authorised the police to take action against them, which happened rarely;
  • In early 2001 the late Minister Gezi installed "war veterans" in key positions in the reconstituted ZANU (PF) provincial executives;
  • April, May and June 2001 saw an intensification of the campaign of terror against the MDC in both the rural areas and the towns, with the involvement of Government officials, as described earlier.

At the end of May 2001 the Secretary-General of the ZNLWVA, Andy Mhlanga, said his association would be meeting to plan an aggressive strategy for the Presidential Election.79 The association would draw up a comprehensive budget and would be looking for at least Z$1.5 million per province, a total of Z$15 million; it would also lobby for a fleet of heavy-duty vehicles to use during the campaign.

As the Presidential Election draws closer, the violence by the "war veterans" against the opposition is likely to escalate.

6.3 Zimbabwe Republic Police

When the farm invasions started in 2000, the courts ordered the police to evict the illegal occupiers. The head of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Commissioner Augustine Chihuri, himself a war veteran, initially adopted the attitude that this was a political matter which could not be handled by the police. By January 2001 he had cast off the cloak of political neutrality and announced "I support ZANU (PF) because it is the ruling party."80

Prior to the June 2000 General Election there were many instances when the police turned a blind eye to violence being perpetrated against white farmers and MDC supporters. Although some members of the force tried to carry out their duties professionally on a politically neutral basis, in general the police failed to intervene or to investigate murder, rape, torture or the destruction of property by the "war veterans". Some people were even taken from police stations and killed by "war veterans".

After the General Election the police force became increasingly partisan in favour of the ruling party. Police and army personnel attacked people in urban areas to punish them for voting for the MDC. Police officers seen reading independent newspapers were regarded as disloyal; those who tried to enforce the law on a non-partisan basis were transferred81 or demoted; and some senior officers left in disgust over the political abuse of the police force.82 One senior officer who took action to save a foreign businessman’s enterprise from the "war veterans" was told to pack his bags and report to a police station. To justify his purge of senior officers, Chihuri alleged that there were reactionary elements in the force, remnants of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts and the British South Africa Police (BSAP).83 In July 2001 he told a Government-controlled newspaper that police officers thought to support opposition political parties would be sacked; an undisclosed number of officers have already been dismissed on these grounds.84

"War veterans" in the police force have received rapid promotion; more have been recruited into the force and some have been placed in charge of rural police stations. These officers have not only refused to assist MDC supporters under attack from ZANU (PF) supporters, but also in some instances have participated in these attacks. Selective enforcement of the law has become the norm, with the police arresting anyone connected with the MDC for offences such inciting or committing public violence, but ignoring similar offences committed by ZANU (PF) supporters. The police regularly carry out raids on MDC party offices and arrest MDC members on flimsy charges. In March 2001 the police imposed a ban on MDC rallies in Chitungwiza, near Harare.85

In essence, the police force has removed the protection of the law from those considered to be hostile to ZANU (PF). It has become an instrument for violence rather than a force to protect people irrespective of their party affiliation. It has become a para-military militia to be used to ensure that Mugabe wins the Presidential Election.

6.4 Zimbabwe National Army

The ZNA consists of about 40,000 soldiers. It has been constantly enlarged in recent years.

The ruling party has made attempts to turn the ZNA into a politically partisan force. The Army Commander, Constantine Chiwenga, is reported to have toured army barracks urging soldiers to rally behind ZANU (PF) to thwart a possible MDC victory in the Presidential Election.86 Many high-ranking ZNA officers are veterans of the liberation war and have benefited considerably from Mugabe’s system of patronage and are thus beholden to him. "War veterans" in the army have received rapid promotion to higher ranks.87

In urban areas, army personnel have participated in the ongoing campaign to punish people for voting for the MDC in the General Election. They have also trained the police units that are being deployed to deal with urban unrest and to harass MDC officials and supporters. In the rural areas the army has provided transport and assistance for farm invasions.

There have been repeated allegations that the ZNA is supplying arms to the "war veterans", but now that the latter have been absorbed as a reserve force in the army they will presumably have free access to army weapons.

6.5 Central Intelligence Organisation

It is thought that there are between 8000 and 10,000 personnel in this unit. The unit is under Mugabe’s direct control. It has a separate and large budget that is not subject to audit by the Auditor-General. Its Director and Deputy Director are both war veterans. It has played an important role in organising and participating in the farm invasions and in organising the terror campaign.

6.6 ZANU (PF) youth

Young ZANU (PF) supporters make up the core of the militias led by the "war veterans" and used by the ruling party to perpetrate violence against MDC officials and supporters.

The Government is planning to introduce a National Youth Service. It says this scheme is aimed at instilling discipline and patriotism. Young people will be eligible for employment in State institutions only if they have done their youth service stint. Opposition political parties fear that the scheme will be a way of indoctrinating young people and recruiting more of them for a nation-wide campaign of violence against the opposition in the run-up to the Presidential Election.

6.7 The civil service

In September 2000 the late Minister Gezi said that he intended retrenching all civil servants and replacing them with ZANU (PF) supporters. He said: "If you want to work for the Government, you should be prepared to support ZANU (PF)."88 There followed a campaign led by the "war veterans" to get rid of all civil servants suspected of sympathising with the MDC. This has affected teachers, police officers, officials in Government offices such as rural district councils and district administrations, and many more.89

The aim of these purges is to ensure that people in rural areas have no access to any locally based MDC sympathisers. Local officials who are members of ZANU (PF) are now in a position to reward party supporters by granting them drought relief, for example, and to withhold services from people who do not support ZANU (PF). Chiefs and Headmen, all of whom are appointed and paid by the Government, tend to be staunch supporters of ZANU (PF) and can be easily used by the party to influence people in their areas to vote for ZANU (PF).   TOP


71 In early June 2000 Amnesty International’s Africa Director, Maina Kiai, stated at a press conference that the violence was part of a deliberate plan by the ruling party and that the violence was State sponsored. See Reuters report 8 June 2000.

72 In recent years he seems to have become increasingly paranoid. He blames everyone else but himself for the grave problems besetting the country. The list of scapegoats is almost endless. It includes white farmers, white business persons, urban blacks, the international financial institutions and the British and American Governments. Mugabe has declared war on all persons and institutions critical of his policies.

73 Other participants in the liberation war have cast considerable doubt upon the liberation war credentials of some of the members of this group, such as Dr Hunzvi.

74 For more details on these statements see Case Studies Section J.

75 Another prominent member of this group of war veterans is Andrew Ndlovu. Ndlovu is a rehabilitated former anti-Government dissident who fought to destabilise Zimbabwe during the mid-1980s. He operated as a dissident in Matabeleland until he received a Government amnesty in 1987. He is alleged to have been involved in the kidnapping and murder of four tourists. He is also alleged to have been involved in a number of murders of DDF workers and a number of rapes.

76 Dr Hunzvi was tried on criminal charges of fraud in which he is alleged to have defrauded the War Victims Compensation Fund of Z$361,620. Although he was acquitted by the High Court of these charges because the State failed to prove its case, the judge said that Hunzvi had been up to some mischief or no good, as there were a number of unsatisfactory features in his evidence and conduct. He has also appeared in court on a charge of defrauding war veterans companies of Z$3 million. Serious allegations have also been made that he had misappropriated funds from the ex-combatants’ company, Zexcom. At one stage it was reported that the police said they were keen to interview him in connection with allegations of fraud. Hunzvi’s Polish ex-wife has alleged that Hunzvi used to beat her when they were married. Before the June election his surgery in a high-density suburb in Harare was used as a torture centre. In the lead up to the Bikita West by-election in January 2001 allegations were made that Hunzvi participated in the petrol bombing of some MDC vehicles and that he personally beat some alleged MDC supporters.

77 Sunday Mail 15 October 2000.

78 Clemency Notice No 1 of 2000.

79 Financial Gazette 31 May 2001.

80 Daily News 16 January 2001. In making this statement Chihuri had in fact committed an offence in terms of the Police Act [Chapter 11.10]. Under this Act (s 48 in the Schedule) it is an offence for a police officers actively to participate in politics.

81 Senior officers Chimwanda and Ncube were quarantined in the "Commissioner’s Pool" introduced by Chihuri to monitor senior officers about whom he is distrustful. Both decided to leave the force. Former Assistant Commissioner Simbi said: "I need not pretend that all is well…The ZRP is going through a very bad patch and some unprofessional fingers that are raised have taken advantage of this." Independent 11 May 2001.

82 Financial Gazette 4 June 2001.

83 Sunday Mail 7 June 2001.

84 Herald 11 July 2001.

85 Daily News 7 March 2001.

86 Financial Gazette 24 May 2001.

87 Financial Gazette 18 July 2001.

88 Herald 12 April 2001.

89 See Case Studies Section G for further details of the scale of this campaign.  TOP