Politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe 2000-2001
A report on the campaign of political repression conducted by the Zimbabwean Government under the guise of carrying out land reform
August 2001

2. Background

From the time the Mugabe Government assumed power in 1980 it has displayed intolerance of political opposition. Having sacrificed much to liberate the country from colonial rule, Mugabe believed that his political party had the right to rule Zimbabwe for all time and was prepared to take whatever measures were necessary to ensure this. In the early 1980s, in response to unrest caused by a small number of armed bandits being used by the South African apartheid regime to destabilise Zimbabwe, his Government orchestrated the killing and torturing of thousands of unarmed civilians in Matabeleland.⁵ It considered that the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), the main opposition party at that time, was behind the unrest, and anyone associated with ZAPU was seen as the enemy.

During the 1980s the Government repeatedly proclaimed its intention to pass a law to make Zimbabwe a one-party State. In 1990 it dropped this plan, but has continued to take measures to ensure that the country remains a de facto one-party State. It sees no distinction between the State and the ruling party. In all election campaigns, for example, it has made extensive use of State resources such as Government vehicles.⁶

Towards the end of the 1990s Zimbabweans were experiencing grave economic hardship, stemming primarily from economic mismanagement and massive corruption. The popularity of ZANU (PF) diminished rapidly. In 1998 there were food riots. In a referendum in early 2000 the people emphatically rejected a new constitution drafted by a Government-appointed commission, endorsed by the ruling party and supported by extensive propaganda.⁷ The "no" vote campaign was spearheaded by a number of organisations, including the newly formed Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This was the first serious challenge to ZANU (PF)’s stranglehold on power. Until this time, with no serious competitors for political power, the Government had maintained a façade of democracy, though it still used violence against political opponents from time to time.8 Now it abandoned the democratic ground rules and launched a campaign of violence against the MDC in the lead up to the General Election in June 2000.

The General Election resulted in a victory for the ruling party, albeit a marginal one.⁹ But the violence did not cease. There has, instead, been an increasing spiral of violence since June 2000 as the ruling party has set about ensuring – at any cost – that Mugabe retains the presidency in the forthcoming Presidential Election.

Meanwhile, the inequitable distribution of land in Zimbabwe remains a pressing and unresolved issue.¹⁰ Certain constraints to land reform were imposed by the independence constitution,¹¹ but they were not enough to account for Mugabe’s repeated failure to grasp the opportunities to implement wide-ranging, donor-supported reform. Even after he embarked upon his "fast-track resettlement" programme (through land occupation and allocation), several foreign Governments and organisations such as the United Nations tried to persuade him to adopt a sensible, internationally supported programme of land reform. He rebuffed these overtures.

The fast-track resettlement programme began in early 2000, when the Government’s popularity had reached an all-time low. The first land occupations were not, as claimed by the Government, a spontaneous protest by land-hungry people. They were planned, organised and executed by ZANU (PF). Large-scale, synchronised invasions of farms by "war veterans" occurred throughout the country within days of the referendum rejecting the constitution. The farm occupiers were transported to farms in Government vehicles. Once there, they received monthly payments and regular food supplies, delivered in Government vehicles. Government Ministers, parliamentarians, Provincial Governors, other high-ranking ZANU (PF) politicians, local party officials and CIO and army personnel were involved in this process, linking up with the "war veterans" and directing or participating in the invasions and in the ensuing violence.¹²

The invasions were, and continue to be, an essential part of a political strategy to combat the growing influence of the MDC and to win back rural support by promising land reform. White farmers supportive of the MDC have been specifically targeted, the aim being to eliminate the MDC’s support base on the farms. Occupied farms have been turned into torture and "re-education" camps. Farm labourers have been forced to attend indoctrination meetings during which beatings are administered to those suspected of supporting the MDC. MDC supporters in surrounding areas have been abducted and taken to the occupied farms and tortured. From their bases on these farms and elsewhere, the militias have mounted raids in the local areas, targetting anyone else suspected of supporting the opposition, including teachers, doctors, nurses and other public servants.   TOP

⁶ On the other hand, it has placed all possible obstacles in the path of opposition parties. The latest obstacle is an amendment to Political Parties (Finance) Act passed in May 2001 that stops the MDC and other political parties from receiving foreign funding. In flagrant violation of these restrictions in July 2001 at the request of President Mugabe, the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi promised to inject about US$900 000 to the party for Mugabe’s presidential campaign. Gaddafi also recently donated 29 Cherokee Jeeps to be used in the presidential campaign. Independent 20 July 2001.

⁷ The loss of popularity of the Government was further manifested in the towns and cities when in early July 2001 huge numbers of workers stayed away from work in response to a call by the ZCTU for a 2-day work boycott. The ZCTU said more than 80% of the country’s businesses and factories were closed during the strike and 95% of the country’s 1.2 million workers stayed at home. This happened despite the Government having declared the stay-away illegal and urging workers to go to work.

⁸ The violence of ruling party agents and supporters against members of opposition parties before and in the aftermath of earlier elections is documented in the following publications:

In relation to the 1985 and 1990 elections:
Welshman Ncube State Security, the Rule of Law and Politics of Repression in Zimbabwe (1990 University of Oslo, Third World Seminar Series);
J Moyo Voting for Democracy Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe (1992 University of Zimbabwe Publications, pp 77–80)

In relation to the 1990 elections:
J Makumbe and D Compaignon Behind the Smokescreen: The Politics of Zimbabwe’s 1995 General Elections pp 147–154 (2000 University of Zimbabwe Publications)

In relation to the 1995 elections, one particularly blatant incident of violence is worth relating. In Gweru just before the 1990 elections two assailants Elias Kanengoni, the head of the CIO for the Midlands Province, and Kizito Chivamba, a senior official in the ZANU (PF) youth league, shot a leading opposition party figure, Patrick Kombayi, badly injuring him. Kombayi was lucky to survive. This case was not covered by the 1990 amnesty relating to politically motivated crimes committed after February 1990 because the crimes of murder and attempted murder were expressly excluded from this amnesty. Eventually Kombayi’s assailants were convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In his judgement the magistrate severely criticised the conduct of one of the law enforcement agencies, saying that it had behaved in a manner that was entirely partial towards the ruling party. He said that the perception of members of opposition parties as enemies who must be eliminated was an extremely dangerous one and one which was entirely contrary to the Constitution which guaranteed freedom to form, join and campaign on behalf of any political party. A few days after the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against conviction, the President pardoned these criminals.

⁹ The MDC won a slight majority of the total votes cast but ZANU (PF) captured 62 constituency seats and the MDC won 57 seats. ZANU (Ndonga) won the remaining seat.

¹⁰ The ruling party tries to portray the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, as a party set up to protect white interests. However, the MDC has repeatedly stated that it is committed to land reform but that it must be carried out in a planned and legal fashion.

¹¹ One major constraint that existed from 1980 to 1990 was the entrenched constitutional provision requiring the Government to pay fair compensation to landowners when their land was expropriated for resettlement. On request this compensation was payable outside the country in foreign currency.

¹² See Who is Responsible? A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-election Violence issued on 20 June 2000 by the Human Rights NGO Forum   TOP