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Politically
motivated violence in Zimbabwe 2000-2001 |
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Contents « Prev Next » 1. Introduction The Government of Zimbabwe, led by Robert Mugabe, would depict the course of events in the country in 2000–2001 along these lines: [The Government] is fighting a Third "Chimurenga."1 This new "war" is a struggle to achieve economic justice for the black majority. The Second Chimurenga war was fought to liberate the country from the yoke of white minority rule. This armed struggle resulted in the political emancipation of the black majority, but not economic emancipation as after 1980 a tiny white settler community continued to dominate the agricultural and commercial economy. In particular, a small number of whites still owned a huge proportion of the most fertile farmland,2 with the black majority being relegated to poor quality land. This gross social and economic injustice could not be allowed to continue. Thus when the landless people "spontaneously" invaded white farmland to register their protest against this gross injustice, Government then felt compelled to act. It thus embarked upon its fast track resettlement programme. The new political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was formed as a front for the whites to resist the moves towards the redistribution of the economic assets of Zimbabwe. Britain and other European powers are sponsoring the MDC because they wanted to protect the property rights of whites and are vigorously opposed to the expropriation of white-owned farmland. These Governments are also waging a viciouus propaganda campaign against Zimbabwe. The Government was justified in taking all necessary measures to prevent the MDC and its Western allies from denying the black majority the economic justice they cried out for. It was perfectly justifiable to use necessary force to overcome resistance to the transformation of the economy in favour of the black majority to achieve economic justice. After all, the colonial regime had violently dispossessed the black majority of their land and had brutally suppressed them for many decades. Apologists for the Mugabe Government play down the political violence or excuse it on the basis that violence is necessary to achieve economic justice. As this report shows, the Government, when faced with an opposition party that was attracting widespread support, refused to allow the democratic process to take its course. Instead, it embarked upon a violent campaign against all political opponents, real and imagined, and used farm invasions to eliminate support for the opposition and land allocations to boost support for the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU (PF)), the ruling party. To justify its actions, it created the myth that the MDC opposes equitable land redistribution. The political violence prior to the General Election in June 2000 has been extensively documented.3 This report focuses mainly on the violence during and since that election, in the lead up to the Presidential Election to be held by 31 March 2002. It seeks to establish where the primary responsibility for the violence lies and to describe the impact of the violence on the people and the economy of Zimbabwe. The report shows that the Mugabe Government is using the land issue to mask its violent suppression of political opposition4 and to deflect attention from its disastrous mismanagement of the economy. TOP 1 #9; Chimurenga is a Shona word derived from the word murenga, meaning "rebel" or "fighter." It was first applied to the uprisings of the indigenous blacks against the white settlers in 1896–1897. The guerrilla war against the settlers became known as the Second Chimurenga war. ZANU (PF) has referred to its present campaign to redistribute land and other economic assets to the black majority as "the Third Chimurenga". 2 It has been estimated that up to 83% of commercial farms in Zimbabwe have changed ownership since 1980. Many farmers have therefore acquired their farms after the Mugabe Government came to power. Some commercial farmers invested large sums of money into their farms after receiving no-interest certificates from the Mugabe Government, meaning that they had been told that Government had not earmarked these farms for acquisition. 3 See:
4 Later in 2001 the ruling party similarly tried to exploit the failure of its own labour dispute mechanism for political purposes. TOP
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